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This article provides a brief overview of Switzerland’s role in 
international peace mediation, examining the historical context, 
policy instruments, and regions of engagement of Swiss peace policy. 
It ﬁnally points to a number of key challenges of the peace mediation 
ﬁeld in light of Switzerland’s experiences.
Switzerland as a mediation actor
Switzerland’s current engagement in peace mediation actually 
represents the continuation of a long-standing tradition. Starting 
around 1870, Switzerland adopted a more active foreign policy and 
sought to contribute to world peace by organizing 
international arbitrations and peace conferences. The Swiss 
government also began to oﬀer its “good oﬃces”, representing one 
state in another state with which the former does not have diplomatic 
relations. Good oﬃces peaked during World War II when Switzerland 
held nearly 200 protective power mandates.
After the war, the Swiss government reverted to a more isolationist 
posture, emphasizing permanent neutrality and choosing to remain 
on the sidelines of the newly created United Nations. However, it 
continued its peace promotion activities, which increasingly included 
mediation, for example brokering an agreement between the Algerian 
National Liberation Front and the French government in 1962. 
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Moreover, Switzerland took on further protective power mandates, 
most famously representing the US in Iran and Cuba.
The end of the Cold War brought profound changes to the attitudes 
of Swiss public opinion and foreign policy decision-makers. Many 
of them embraced a new concept of security, centred on the notion 
of ‘human security’. At the same time, they sought to position 
Switzerland as a more active player in the world, invoking the phrase 
‘active neutrality’ to this end. Since domestic politics put a check on 
Swiss participation in military peacekeeping missions, the emphasis 
was rather put on civilian peacebuilding and mediation in particular.
In this context, three main arguments emerged in the discourse 
around the Swiss government’s engagement in peace mediation. 
First, mediation is said to contribute to a more secure world, which 
is increasingly interconnected and requires global burden-sharing 
to counter security threats. Second, it was argued that mediation 
improves Switzerland’s standing in the world, opening doors for 
Swiss diplomacy in Washington, Moscow and other places. Third, 
mediation is described as a good ﬁt in terms of the values that many 
Swiss identify with, such as neutrality, the humanitarian tradition 
and the protection of minority rights.
These arguments have gained momentum in the last ten years and 
as a result, Switzerland has extended its peace promotion engagement 
on multiple fronts. Accordingly, Swiss voters have anchored peace 
promotion in the federal constitution and the government has deﬁned 
it as one of its ﬁve foreign policy objectives. Also, peacebuilding was 
institutionalized within the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign 
Aﬀairs with the creation of a division dealing speciﬁcally with human 
security issues – the Human Security Division. Moreover, at four-
year intervals starting in 2004, the Swiss Parliament has approved 
a credit facility, which provides the government with ﬁxed annual 
budgets for peace promotion activities. During her tenure as head of 
the Swiss FDFA between 2003 and 2011, Federal Councillor Micheline 
Calmy-Rey also showed leadership in pushing the mediation logic of 
talking with all actors who are willing to talk, which helped to make 
the idea of mediation known domestically. 
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External perceptions were also important with regard to fostering 
Swiss engagements in peace mediation. As a small state with a long-
standing policy of neutrality and a consensus-oriented system of 
democracy, Switzerland is often perceived by conﬂict parties and 
other mediators as non-threatening while at the same time being 
seen as competent. Another factor is that Switzerland does not have 
a policy of listing armed non-state actors as terrorist groups, and as 
a non-member, it is not obligated to follow the European Union’s 
policy in this area. This means that representatives of the Swiss 
government can legally talk to many of these groups, even as other 
countries are precluded from doing so.
Taking these factors into account, since 2000, Switzerland 
has been engaged in approximately 20 processes in 15 countries 
and regions. The list below presents a selection of some of these 
engagements:
• Armenia–Turkey Protocols (2009)
• Burundi: Arusha and post-Arusha peace talks (1997–2008)
• Colombia: ELN – Government of Colombia (2005–2008) and FARC 
– GoC talks (2002–2008) 
• Cyprus: talks on Bürgenstock (2004)
• Indonesia, Aceh: Coaching of GAM (2005), support in 
implementation of agreement (2005–2007)
• Middle East: Geneva Initiative, support of track 1.5 Israel 
Palestine talks (2003–ongoing); support of Israel-Syrian track 
II (2005–2007)
• Nepal: support of peace process with process and constitutional 
experts (2006–ongoing)
• Uganda: North Uganda–LRA process (2006–2007)
• Sri Lanka: hosting of LTTE – Government of Sri Lanka talks (2006)
• Sudan: Nuba Mountains Bürgenstock Agreement Swiss-US co-
mediation (2002), North-South mediation expert in IGAD CPA 
mediation process (2002–2005), Darfur: power sharing expertise 
and capacity building (2005–2010)
• Western Sahara: support to talks led by the UN (2010–ongoing)
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Switzerland has various tools at its disposal to support mediation 
processes in diﬀerent phases and on diﬀerent tracks. One of these 
tools is the direct involvement of Swiss government representatives, 
such as the State Secretary or its special envoys. Switzerland 
also seconds mediation experts that work in teams led by other 
entities, such as the UN. It organizes training workshops, aimed at 
strengthening the mediation capacities of regional or international 
organisations. Switzerland also has strategic partnerships with 
NGOs working in the ﬁeld of mediation (e.g. Berghof Foundation for 
Peace Support, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Conciliation 
Resources). Finally, it funds various peacebuilding programmes and 
deploys advisors working to support peace processes at various levels 
of society (grassroots to government).
Challenges of peace mediation
The Swiss experience reveals a number of key challenges that are 
illustrative of the general challenges in the mediation ﬁeld. 
Motivation(s). From the outset, the promoters of peace policy in 
Switzerland have put forward two distinct lines of argumentation. One 
line is that peace mediation corresponds to Switzerland’s values and 
its humanitarian tradition, the other being that mediation promotes 
the national interest by enhancing Switzerland’s standing in the 
world. The combination of these two motivations has been eﬀective 
because it caters to two audiences: those thinking that foreign policy 
should reﬂect their values and those focusing on material beneﬁts. 
However, this double argumentation does pose several challenges. 
For the latter group, the challenge is to not ‘oversell’ mediation or to 
foster unrealistic expectations of what mediation can achieve. As far 
as the former audience is concerned, the challenge is to ensure that 
mediation is not self-referential, but that the yardstick of success 
remains improving the situation for people in countries of conﬂict.
Risk-taking. Inevitably, peace mediation is messy and politically 
delicate. Mediators can become scapegoats or misused for other 
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political purposes. In 2008 the Colombian government discredited a 
Swiss mediator, partly to detract attention from their military hostage 
rescue operation. For a state like Switzerland the question is to 
what degree it is prepared to take risks in mediation processes. Of 
course, risky engagements can backﬁre politically. However, if a state 
is risk-averse, there is a danger that it will circle around mediation, 
missing opportunities for getting involved or opting out at the most 
crucial phase in the process and leaving the parties in a ditch. The 
challenge is for a state to build domestic support and a cross-political 
consensus on peace mediation, empowering its representatives to 
take the necessary risks to achieve their intended outcome. In this 
regard, Norway serves as a role model for other small state mediators.
Coherence. Mediation is not a standalone tool. A range of policy 
areas have repercussions on countries of conﬂict, and diﬀerent tools 
can be brought to bear to support peace processes, some of which go 
beyond conventional peace promotion. In the case of Switzerland, 
trade policy, development aid and security assistance are all relevant. 
The challenge is to seek complementarity and coherence between 
these diﬀerent areas as well as the government agencies in charge of 
them, in the spirit of the ‘whole-of-government’ approach. Thus, 
Switzerland’s experience supporting the peace process in Sudan has 
shown that regular contacts between persons in charge of the Sudan 
ﬁle in diﬀerent agencies fosters the implementation of a coherent 
approach.
Professionalisation. Mediation processes are increasingly complex 
and require specialized knowledge on the part of the mediators. Small 
states like Switzerland are often sought-after as mediators precisely 
because they can provide such knowledge. Therefore, the challenge 
for an aspiring small state is to build up the expertise and human 
resources to make it an attractive candidate in mediation processes. 
This can happen within state structures; as mentioned above, 
Switzerland has created a division within the Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs exactly for this purpose. Flexible structures 
are also promising, allowing for human rotation and knowledge 
transfer between state and non-state actors. It is vital that eﬀorts 
to professionalize peace mediation are supported ﬁnancially and by 
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building up human resources through long-term training and career 
management.
Collaboration. Peace mediation is a crowded ﬁeld in some cases, 
but not in others. Thus, there are worrying signs of competition and 
turf battles between diﬀerent mediation actors in some conﬂicts, 
while less attractive conﬂicts are neglected. The challenge for small 
state mediators is therefore to collaborate with others using their 
speciﬁc comparative advantages. One area of collaboration is joint 
training. For example, the Swiss government organizes the annual 
Peace Mediation Course, bringing Swiss mediators together with 
practitioners from other foreign ministries, the UN as well as NGOs. 
Another possibility is for small states to provide targeted support to 
processes led by other actors. For example, a senior Swiss mediation 
expert was brought in to coach GAM negotiators in the Aceh 
negotiations mediated by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari 
and his Crisis Management Initiative.
Conclusion
Small states have unique comparative advantages in the ﬁeld of 
mediation, as they are generally more nimble than larger mediation 
entities such as the UN, regional organisations or powerful states. 
At the same time, they have more resources, political clout and 
democratic legitimacy than NGO mediators. Nonetheless, small 
states are confronted with numerous challenges when seeking to 
develop their mediation proﬁle: creating a solid domestic consensus 
for mediation, ﬁtting mediation activities into a coherent ‘whole-of-
government’ approach, professionalizing the ﬁeld of mediation by 
investing in human resources, and collaborating with other mediators 
in order to increase eﬃciency and minimize negative competition. 
Switzerland’s experience in addressing these challenges seems to 
follow an incremental, step-by-step approach. The hope is that this 
leads to a more stable basis for greater mediation activities.
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